FinCEN said reports filed with it described more than 100 days of perpetrator contact on average. Separately, FBI data recorded $7.228 billion in cryptocurrency-investment-fraud losses in 2025, and NASAA reported 229 new pig-butchering investigations and 19 actions in 2024. The datasets do not measure one common group of cases.
What the 100-day figure measures
From FinCEN's September 2024 congressional testimony:
Reports filed with FinCEN described more than 100 days of perpetrator contact with victims on average.
That indicates a long relationship in the reports FinCEN analyzed. It is not a probability distribution for all scams, nor evidence that a particular victim was contacted for exactly that long.
FinCEN's figure comes from Bank Secrecy Act reports referencing its alert. FBI complaint totals and state investigation counts come from different reporting systems and cannot be merged into a single measured "pig-butchering" population.
The scale
| Measure | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Crypto investment fraud losses, 2025 | $7.228 billion | FBI IC3 |
| Crypto investment fraud complaints, 2025 | 61,559 | FBI IC3 |
| All investment fraud, 2025 | $8.65 bn / 72,984 complaints | FBI IC3 |
| BSA filings referencing FinCEN's alert | more than 8,600 | FinCEN |
| States with identified victims | at least 41 | FinCEN |
| New state-level investigations involving pig butchering | 229 | NASAA (2024) |
| State-level enforcement actions | 19 | NASAA (2024) |
Source consistency note, 9 October 2026: The IC3 cryptocurrency highlight gives 7.228 billion dollars; its detailed cryptocurrency loss table gives 7,277,868,919 dollars for investment fraud. The rounded 7.2 billion describes the scale without treating those internally differing figures as identical. Calculations below use the highlight figure. The FBI's cryptocurrency-investment-fraud category is broader than this specific relationship-based scam. Its $7.228 billion cannot be described as pig-butchering losses alone.
Why the investigation-to-action ratio is not a conversion rate
NASAA's 2025 Enforcement Report, reporting 2024 activity, records 229 new investigations involving pig butchering and 19 enforcement actions.
The two figures are activity counts for the year, not a followed cohort. The report does not say that the 19 actions arose from those 229 new investigations. Dividing them gives about 12, but it does not establish a one-in-12 chance that a case will produce an action.
NASAA says these cases can be time-consuming because assets move across digital wallets and platforms; respondents can be abroad or unidentifiable, and jurisdiction can be uncertain. Those are documented challenges, not a case-level explanation of the 229/19 counts.
Why the 100 days matters
Some fraud is transactional — a cold call, a pitch and a payment. Relationship-based schemes may instead develop over weeks or months.
This is relational, and running it over three months changes the psychology of every stage that follows.
Trust is built before money is mentioned. Over three months of daily contact, the relationship becomes the context in which the investment is later discussed — not a proposition from a stranger.
Small withdrawals are permitted. Early "profits" are paid out, which demonstrates the platform works and converts skepticism into confidence.
The victim recruits themselves. By the time larger sums are requested, the victim has usually reached their own conclusion about the opportunity. Nobody had to sell them.
Standard warnings do not fit. Warnings focused only on high-pressure sales can miss a patient, relationship-based approach.
What it looks like
The typology FinCEN describes, and NASAA's investigations document, follows a consistent shape.
Initial contact appears accidental — a wrong number, a dating app match, a professional networking message.
Conversation continues for weeks without any mention of money.
Investment enters as an aside — the contact mentions their own trading, or a family member's platform.
The platform looks legitimate. Purpose-built interfaces displaying balances that rise.
Small withdrawals succeed. This is the pivot point.
Larger deposits follow, often including borrowed money.
Withdrawal fails. Taxes, fees, compliance holds — each requiring further payment.
The elder overlap
Pig butchering intersects sharply with fraud against older victims, and both trends are moving fast.
NASAA's senior data for 2024: 3,613 complaints of alleged misconduct against older investors, producing 1,652 investigations and 53 enforcement actions involving 676 senior victims. Pig butchering was the second most common scheme type affecting seniors, with 91 investigations, behind digital assets at 151.
NASAA Model Act reports of suspected exploitation of vulnerable adults exceeded 6,500 in 2024 — a 52% increase on 2023 and a 492% increase on 2020.
That is a substantial increase within this NASAA reporting series; it does not establish the fastest growth across all fraud datasets.
IC3's 2025 figures for victims over 60: 201,266 complaints, up 37% on 2024, and $7.748 billion in losses, up 59%.
Why recovery can be difficult
Several features can make recovery difficult. None establishes a measured zero or near-zero recovery rate for this entire category.
Cryptocurrency transfers generally cannot be reversed by the sender. Funds can sometimes be traced, frozen or seized when they reach a cooperating service or custodian; this differs from reversing the original on-chain transfer.
Perpetrators may be abroad or unidentified. NASAA cites jurisdiction and identification as practical obstacles in some cases, not proof that all cases are beyond enforcement.
Timing matters. The FBI's Recovery Asset Team reported freezing $679 million of $1.16 billion in attempted theft across 3,900 incidents in 2025. That program chiefly addresses reported transfers eligible for its intervention; its aggregate result is not a recovery rate for cryptocurrency-investment or pig-butchering cases. FinCEN's contact-duration figure does not measure how long victims waited after a transfer to report it.
Do not infer an overall recovery percentage by comparing loss figures and asset freezes from different agencies, populations and periods. This article does not establish a reliable recovery rate for this scam type.
What actually helps
Check the platform and people, but know the limits. Registration requirements depend on the activity and applicable exemptions; an absent listing alone does not prove illegality. Check FINRA BrokerCheck for broker-dealers and representatives, SEC IAPD for investment advisers, and the relevant state regulator. A listing does not prove the person contacting you is who they claim to be. Match the web address, phone, email domain and custody details independently, and contact the firm through verified details rather than a promoter's link.
Advance withdrawal demands are a strong warning sign. A demand to send more money, especially to a new wallet or account, before alleged profits can be released is common in these schemes. It is not a standalone legal test; independently verify the firm and stop sending money while you seek help.
The relationship is not evidence. Duration is the method, not a reassurance.
Report promptly. Rapid reporting can improve the chance that a bank transfer or traceable asset can be stopped or frozen, but recovery is not guaranteed and depends on the payment route and timing.
Our scam detection tools cover platform and individual verification, and the investor protection lesson walks through the registries.
What the FinCEN alert asked institutions to look for
FIN-2023-Alert005, issued in September 2023, is the document that generated the 8,600-plus Bank Secrecy Act filings referenced above, and reading its indicators tells you more about the mechanics than any loss figure.
The alert lists behavioral indicators that financial institutions may observe: a customer new to virtual assets beginning exchange transfers; mention of a new online contact giving investment guidance; liquidation of existing assets or borrowing to fund the opportunity; and escalating transfers. These are risk indicators, not proof that any individual transfer is fraudulent.
The long contact window helps explain why a person may resist warnings from friends or bank staff. It does not mean every victim will respond that way, and the FinCEN testimony does not measure how often it happens.
The 2025 numbers, as the FBI reports them
The Internet Crime Complaint Center's 2025 annual report counts reported complaints, not all incidents or a census of this scheme. Its categories include fraud outside pig butchering.
| IC3, calendar 2025 | Complaints | Reported losses |
|---|---|---|
| All internet crime | 1,008,597 | $20.877 billion |
| Investment fraud (all types) | 72,984 | $8.649 billion |
| Cryptocurrency investment fraud | 61,559 | $7.2 billion |
| Confidence and romance fraud | 23,159 | $929 million |
| Complainants aged 60 and over (all crime types) | 201,266 | $7.748 billion |
The $7.228 billion cryptocurrency-investment-fraud figure is about 84% of the $8.649 billion all-investment-fraud total. That arithmetic does not identify what portion involved long-term relationship scams. The over-60 row covers all reported crime types for that age group, so dividing its losses by complaints is not a pig-butchering per-victim average. These are reported figures, not a complete population count.
Dividing $7.228 billion by 61,559 complaints yields about $117,000 of reported cryptocurrency-investment-fraud loss per complaint. It is an arithmetic mean across that FBI category, not the typical loss, not a matched victim-level statistic, and not proof that each case involved a 100-day relationship.
Before you act on this
This article explains how something works. It is general education, not advice about your situation. It does not consider your goals, income, tax position or how much risk you can afford.
Investing involves risk, including losing money. Before you act, speak to a licensed professional. You can check whether someone is licensed at Investor.gov and FINRA BrokerCheck.
Common questions
Why is it called that?
It translates a Chinese phrase describing fattening a pig before slaughter — the extended grooming period before the final loss. Some regulators now avoid the term as insensitive to victims; NASAA and FinCEN both use it in published material.
Do the platforms look convincing?
Yes. They are purpose-built, display balances, and process small withdrawals successfully. Visual assessment is not a defense.
Is any of the money recoverable?
Sometimes, but this article does not establish a recovery rate. Report promptly to the relevant bank or exchange and IC3, preserve transaction records, and avoid paying anyone who guarantees recovery. An on-chain transfer cannot simply be recalled, but assets may sometimes be traced or frozen later.
Are victims only older people?
No. The FBI's cryptocurrency-investment-fraud data shows reports from multiple age groups. The over-60 figures quoted above cover all IC3 crime types, so they should not be used as a pig-butchering-specific age trend.
Related reading: Investment fraud and older victims · Social media is where investment fraud starts · What victims actually recover
The industrial structure behind it
One feature separates this from other fraud types and explains why enforcement struggles.
Reporting by international bodies and US agencies describes organized compounds, predominantly in Southeast Asia, where the people sending the messages are frequently themselves trafficking victims — recruited under false employment pretences and held under coercion.
That structure has three consequences for anyone assessing the risk.
The person you are speaking to may not be the perpetrator. Which does nothing to reduce the loss, and complicates every intuition about who you are dealing with.
Enforcement may face jurisdictional problems. NASAA says respondents can be abroad or unidentifiable. The 229 investigations and 19 actions are annual activity counts, not a measured investigation-to-action conversion rate.
Some operations are organized at scale. Reports of scam compounds explain one operating model, but FinCEN's 100-day average does not, by itself, establish the perpetrators' labor costs or organization in every case.
What separates this from other investment fraud
Three characteristics, and together they explain why conventional advice fails against it.
Pressure may arrive late. A relationship can develop over weeks or months before a money request. FinCEN's figure describes average contact duration in the reports it analyzed, not a universal 100-day pre-loss interval.
A social approach is common. Initial contact may appear accidental, romantic or professional rather than overtly commercial, according to FinCEN's typology.
A polished interface is not proof. Scam platforms can display plausible balances and may permit a small withdrawal, but neither behavior verifies custody or the ability to withdraw the full balance.
Many familiar boiler-room heuristics are weaker here. Registration checks remain useful, but a copied name or registration number can be used in an impersonation scam, so identity and contact details must also be matched to the official record.
More common questions
Can banks stop these transfers?
Sometimes. FinCEN's alert exists precisely so institutions can identify the pattern, and more than 8,600 BSA filings have referenced it. But a customer instructing a transfer to their own crypto exchange account is difficult to distinguish from ordinary activity.
Does the platform ever pay out?
Some scam platforms allow small withdrawals to build trust. A successful test withdrawal does not prove that later deposits are safe or that the displayed balance is real.
Where to go next
No single check defeats this fraud type. Registration, identity, custody and contact details should be verified independently. Our scam detection tools cover platform and individual verification against the official registries, and the investor protection lesson walks through what to check and in what order — including why a successful small withdrawal is not proof that a platform is genuine.
Sources
Primary sources. FinCEN's 2024 testimony · NASAA's 2025 enforcement report · FBI IC3 2025 report · FINRA BrokerCheck · SEC IAPD
Related research on this site. The full dataset and method behind this topic: Investment Scams: $5.7bn Lost in 2024, Median Loss $9,196.
Education, not advice. We report what regulators have published and make no assessment of any specific firm. Inclusion on a warning list is not a finding of wrongdoing, and absence is not an endorsement.
Additional source detail
FinCEN congressional testimony (September 2024) for the contact-duration finding and BSA reports; NASAA 2025 Enforcement Report for 2024 state activity; FBI IC3 2025 Internet Crime Report for separately defined complaint and loss categories and Recovery Asset Team totals. These three sources do not provide a shared case-level dataset.
License. These figures may be reproduced with attribution to StockEducation.com and a link to this page.
